Marianne Martinez
The Schlieffen Plan was a German battle plan devised in 1905 by Alfred, Count von Schlieffen, Chief of the German General Staff, to secure victory against both France and Russia. The plan was designed to allow Germany to wage a successful two-front war. It called for a massive force of four army groups, including cavalry divisions, infantry corps, replacement corps, and reserve brigades, to invade France through neutral Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, rather than across the common border. This force would then wheel south and east, turning into the flanks and rear of the hardened French defenses along the German border. The plan relied on speed and the element of surprise, and Schlieffen calculated that Germany could defeat France within six weeks. However, the Schlieffen Plan underestimated the military capabilities and mobilization capacities of both France and Russia, and the invasion of neutral Belgium brought Britain into the war. Ultimately, the plan failed to achieve its intended swift victory and resulted in a prolonged conflict.
| Characteristics | Values |
|---|---|
| Manpower ratio | 7:1 from right wing to left |
| Number of men | 2 million |
| Number of rail cars | 200,000 |
| Number of divisions required | 24 |
| Time to achieve victory | 40 days |
| Time to beat the French | 6 weeks |
| Staff in 1913 | 650 men |
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What You'll Learn
- The Schlieffen Plan was a study calling for 24 divisions to invade France
- It was designed to allow Germany to wage a two-front war against France and Russia
- The plan was to be executed by a staff of 650 men, commanding an army five times greater than in 1870
- Schlieffen's strategy was inspired by the Battle of Cannae, a pivotal engagement during the Second Punic War
- The plan was criticised as risky, provocative, and wasteful of men and resources
The Schlieffen Plan was a study calling for 24 divisions to invade France
The Schlieffen Plan was a study, written in January 1906, calling for 24 divisions to invade France. It was devised by Alfred, Graf (Count) von Schlieffen, Chief of the German General Staff, in response to a strategic concern that had preoccupied German military tacticians since the 1870s. If Germany found itself at war with both France and Russia, it would be forced to fight on two fronts, dividing its resources and doubling the risk. Schlieffen's plan aimed to secure victory against both countries by focusing on defeating one antagonist quickly before dealing with the other.
Schlieffen's strategy involved invading France through the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Belgium, rather than across the common border. He believed that by invading through these countries, which were neutral and lacked significant military forces, Germany could outflank and surround the French troops positioned on the German border. Schlieffen also developed a detailed timetable that considered possible French responses, taking advantage of the lightly defended Franco-German border. With this plan, he believed Germany could defeat France within six weeks, concluding with a decisive battle in the south.
The Schlieffen Plan was notable for its emphasis on speed and massive force. It called for a large force on the extreme German right, consisting of cavalry divisions, infantry corps, replacement corps, and reserve brigades. This force was to sweep through neutral Belgium and turn into the flanks and rear of the French defenses. The plan relied on quickly overwhelming the French and achieving a swift and conclusive victory. Schlieffen's philosophy was that "to win, we must be the stronger of the two at the point of impact."
However, the Schlieffen Plan was controversial within the German high command. Some considered it risky, provocative, and wasteful of resources. Schlieffen's successor, General von Moltke, modified the plan by reducing troop numbers and excluding the Netherlands from the invasion route. When World War I broke out in 1914, Germany implemented a modified version of the Schlieffen Plan, invading Belgium and encountering strong resistance from Belgian forces, which delayed their advance. Ultimately, the Schlieffen Plan was partially successful in achieving rapid penetration into France but faced challenges due to the strain on German troops and supply lines.
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It was designed to allow Germany to wage a two-front war against France and Russia
The Schlieffen Plan was a battle strategy devised by German tacticians to secure victory against both France and Russia. The plan was designed to allow Germany to wage a two-front war successfully. Germany was surrounded by France and Russia, with only Austria-Hungary as an ally. German military strategists had long considered the problem of fighting a two-front war, which would divide their resources and double the risk.
The Schlieffen Plan was first proposed in 1905 by Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the German General Staff. Schlieffen's plan was to knock out one enemy quickly and then deal with the other. He decided that France was the enemy to be defeated first, with Russia held off until the French were annihilated. Schlieffen believed that Russia would take longer to mobilise than France, so Germany should focus almost all of its resources on a decisive battle in the west. He set his sights on capturing Paris and forcing a French surrender quickly, within two months, and then turning Germany's full attention to Russia.
Schlieffen's plan involved some German troops entering France through its lightly defended northern borders, but most would invade via Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. These three nations were neutral, lacked sizeable military forces, and had borders with France that were largely unprotected. Once into northern France, four waves of German troops would sweep southwest towards Paris. Since most French troops would be positioned on the German border, they could be outflanked and surrounded. Schlieffen predicted victory could be achieved in as little as 40 days. The plan relied on speed, so the Germans committed their reserves with the 1st and 2nd Armies on the right flank from the outset of the campaign.
The Schlieffen Plan was a bold and daring strategy that reflected Schlieffen's philosophy: "To win, we must be the stronger of the two at the point of impact. Our only hope of this lies in making our own choice of operations, not in waiting passively for whatever the enemy chooses to do.". However, not all in the German high command supported the plan. Some thought it risky, provocative, and wasteful of men and resources. Schlieffen's replacement, General von Moltke, shared this view and made substantial changes to the plan prior to and during its implementation.
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The plan was to be executed by a staff of 650 men, commanding an army five times greater than in 1870
The Schlieffen Plan was a battle plan devised by Alfred, Count von Schlieffen, Chief of the German General Staff, in 1905 and 1906. The plan was designed to allow Germany to wage a two-front war successfully against France and Russia. Schlieffen believed that Russia would take longer to mobilise than France, so Germany should focus its resources on a swift and decisive victory in the west. The plan involved invading France through the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Belgium, rather than across the common border. Schlieffen's plan was modified by his successor, Helmuth von Moltke, who reduced troop numbers and removed the Netherlands from the battle plan.
By 1913, Moltke had a staff of 650 men, commanding an army five times greater than in 1870. The German army relied on delegation of command to cope with the increase in numbers and space and the decrease in the time available to get results. Moltke continued to plan for a short war while urging the civilian administration to prepare for a long one, which only made him appear indecisive.
The Schlieffen Plan was a bold and daring strategy that reflected Schlieffen's philosophy: "To win, we must be the stronger of the two at the point of impact. Our only hope of this lies in making our own choice of operations, not in waiting passively for whatever the enemy chooses to do." However, not everyone in the German high command supported the plan. Some thought it was risky, provocative, and wasteful of men and resources.
The plan called for four army groups, called the Bataillon Carré, to mass on the extreme German right. This northernmost force consisted of 5 cavalry divisions, 17 infantry corps, 6 Ersatzkorps (replacement corps), and several Landwehr (reserve) and Landsturm (men over 45) brigades. These forces were to sweep down on Paris, encircling the city and driving the remaining French forces back. However, the plan had risks. Invading neutral Belgium threatened to bring Britain into the war, and failure would expend vital manpower and resources needed to fight on two fronts.
When World War I broke out in 1914, Germany found itself surrounded by the alliance between France and Russia, with only Austria-Hungary as an ally. German forces began their attack on August 4, 1914, with most of the army moving into Belgium, bringing Britain into the war. The Schlieffen Plan relied on speed, and the Germans committed their reserves early in the campaign. While the plan allowed for some rapid penetration into France, it also created problems. The speed of the advance placed a great strain on the troops and supply lines, and Germany underestimated the military capabilities of both France and Russia.
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Schlieffen's strategy was inspired by the Battle of Cannae, a pivotal engagement during the Second Punic War
The Schlieffen Plan was a German battle strategy devised by Alfred, Count von Schlieffen, chief of the German General Staff, in 1905. It was designed to allow Germany to wage a two-front war successfully. Schlieffen was an ardent student of military history, and his strategic plan was inspired by the Battle of Cannae in 216 BCE, a pivotal engagement during the Second Punic War. At Cannae, the Carthaginian general Hannibal defeated a much larger Roman force with a successful double envelopment, turning the Roman army's flanks and destroying it.
Schlieffen was convinced that a modern enemy force could be defeated in the same way, and the execution of a massive flank attack became the main focus of his plan. He proposed that Germany's advantage over France and Russia—its likely opponents in a continental war—was that the two were separated. Germany, therefore, could eliminate one while the other was kept in check. With a massive troop concentration and rapid deployment, Germany could then combine its forces to defeat the other. Schlieffen worked out a detailed timetable that took into account possible French responses, with particular attention paid to the lightly defended Franco-German border. He believed that Germany could defeat France within six weeks, concluding with a decisive "super Cannae" in the south.
The Schlieffen Plan was unique in that it ran counter to prevailing German military wisdom, which was principally derived from Carl von Clausewitz's seminal work "On War" (1832) and the strategic thought of the elder Helmuth von Moltke. Schlieffen replaced the Clausewitzian concept of "Schwerpunkt" ("centre of gravity") with the idea of continuous forward movement designed to annihilate the enemy. The plan called for a manpower ratio of 7:1 from the right wing to the left, with a massive force breaking through at the Metz-Diedenhofen area and sweeping all French forces before it, swinging like a door hinged in the Alsace region.
However, the Schlieffen Plan was controversial and faced criticism from some members of the German high command, who thought it risky, provocative, and wasteful of men and resources. Friedrich Adolf von Bernhardi, for example, argued that the need for additional manpower and the creation of new units would weaken the regular army. The German navy also opposed the plan, as resources would be directed towards land engagements rather than battleship development. Despite these criticisms, the Schlieffen Plan was implemented, and while it allowed for rapid penetration into France, the advance created its own problems, leading to fatigue and battle weariness among German troops.
In conclusion, Schlieffen's strategy was indeed inspired by the Battle of Cannae, with its focus on massive flank attacks and the encirclement and annihilation of the enemy. However, the plan faced challenges and criticisms, and ultimately, Germany did not achieve the quick victory that Schlieffen had envisioned.
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The plan was criticised as risky, provocative, and wasteful of men and resources
The Schlieffen Plan was a battle strategy devised by German tacticians to secure victory against both France and Russia in the event of a two-front war. The plan was first proposed in 1905 by Alfred von Schlieffen, chief of the German general staff. Schlieffen believed that Germany could only win a short war and that the army needed to be operationally superior to its enemies.
The Schlieffen Plan was also criticised for being provocative. It relied on speed, with German troops entering Belgium as a surprise attack. However, Belgian military forces, supported by civilian militia, managed to hold up the Germans for almost four weeks, double the anticipated time. This delay placed a great strain on the German troops, most of whom were travelling on foot, and on the long German supply lines.
The plan also underestimated the military and mobilisation capabilities of both France and Russia. On the Eastern Front, the Russians launched an offensive against Germany faster than expected. In addition, the speed of the German advance led to fatigue and battle weariness among the troops, who were frequently engaged in small battles along the way.
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Frequently asked questions
The Schlieffen Plan called for 24 divisions on top of those already available to the German army. It also called for four army groups, the Bataillon Carré, to mass on the extreme German right.
The northernmost force of the Bataillon Carré consisted of 5 cavalry divisions, 17 infantry corps, 6 Ersatzkorps (replacement corps), and a number of Landwehr (reserve) and Landsturm (men over the age of 45) brigades.
The manpower ratio was 7:1 from right wing to left.
